Farewell to Asia

HIGH on the flight deck of a warship docked in Tokyo Bay, America’s outgoing defence secretary, Ashton Carter, offered a tribute to Asian allies on December 6th that was at once heartfelt and possibly redundant after Donald Trump takes office next month. For eight years an “Asia rebalance” has seen generals, diplomats and trade envoys commanded by Barack Obama, devote more energy and time to the Asia-Pacific. Bluntly, this pivot was intended to shift American attention away from thankless wars in the Middle East and from a moribund Europe, towards a region deemed likely to dominate the 21st century.

With the great grey bulk of the USS Ronald Reagan, an aircraft-carrier, looming behind him, Mr Carter hailed the Asia rebalance as vital to both regional security and America’s national interests. Our military alliance with Japan is not only stronger than ever, he declared, but offers “equal benefits for both countries.”

That is not likely to convince Mr Trump, who won office declaring that America is being robbed, cheated and taken for granted by foreigners. He grumbles that feckless allies should cover more of the costs of maintaining American bases overseas. He has sounded especially indignant about Japan, which is protected by a defence treaty with America but barred by its pacifist post-war constitution from joining conflicts sparked by a strike on American territory—or as Mr Trump put it, “If we’re attacked [the Japanese]…can sit at home and watch Sony television.”

Mr Trump does not merely find foreigners ungrateful. He is scornful of multinational compacts and regional alliances, preferring bilateral negotiations and one-on-one tests of strength and guile. That is one reason why he has promised to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal between 12 Pacific Rim nations, including Japan.

Small wonder that Mr Carter began his 25,000-mile farewell trip with stops in Asia and repeated paeans to the rebalance. Back home in America conservatives wonder whether there is much rebalance to save. Such folk consider the “pivot to Asia” little more than a clever slogan, aimed at diverting attention from chaos in the Middle East and the spread of Islamist terrorism, which they blame on Mr Obama.

The critics are being too glib. The ship aboard which Mr Carter spoke is proof that, when it comes to military power, the Asia rebalance had real-world effects. Commissioned in 2015 the Izumo is the largest warship launched by Japan since the second world war (also the cleanest ship that Lexington has ever visited, scrubbed and buffed to a near-hospital shine). In part its construction reflects the hawkishness of the prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who has challenged the post-war pacifist traditions that so provoke Mr Trump. Japan still has a “Maritime Self-Defence Force”, not a navy. Officers of the Izumo may insist that their ship is a destroyer that happens to carry helicopters, and talk of how handy it will be for humanitarian missions such as earthquake relief. But in truth Japan has built a lethally capable helicopter-carrier.

The Izumo represents a 20,000-tonne bet on the Asia rebalance. Everything from its command-and-control systems to its helicopter fleet is designed for combat alongside allies, starting with the Americans. The US Marine Corps has already landed Ospreys, thunderous flying troop-carriers that would be vital in an amphibious war with China or North Korea, on the Izumo. The ship lies across an inlet at Yokosuka from some of the most advanced vessels in the American navy—part of a Pentagon push to send the newest ships and warplanes to Asia, alongside tens of thousands of extra troops. Mr Carter calls America a “catalyst” for co-operation in Asia. Officers note that South Korean, Japanese and American ships held anti-ballistic missile exercises in June 2016, as fears of North Korean aggression mounted—their first such trilateral exercise. Japan has also joined what were bilateral American exercises with India. Despite the election in the Philippines of a violently populist, often Yankee-bashing president, Rodrigo Duterte, his generals still support deeper co-operation with America, as set out in an agreement signed in 2014.

Pivot, then pirouette

Perhaps Mr Trump will be persuaded to keep advanced kit in Asia by his pick for defence secretary, James Mattis, a much-respected former marine general. Several realist arguments may be tried on the next president. American officers talk of the “tyranny of distance”, and the incalculable benefits of having bases in the region. They also note that Japan pays $4bn a year towards the direct and indirect costs of its American bases. Mr Obama left Mr Trump visibly shaken, shortly after his victory, with an Oval Office briefing about dangers he will face, starting with North Korea’s nuclear programme. Yet Mr Trump is hard to predict. He made a combative start to his Asia policy when he agreed to speak directly on the telephone to the Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen, in defiance of decades of Chinese pressure to isolate Taiwan (see article). It remains unclear whether Mr Trump has a clear goal in mind, beyond showing China his toughness.

In the end the Asia rebalance will not live or die because of where ships are moored. The larger threat involves Mr Trump’s “America First” mistrust of multilateral alliances and pacts, including TPP. Fitfully, and with many false starts, a greater American presence has prompted new co-operation between Asian nations united by fears of Chinese bullying and North Korean brinkmanship, and by a desire to build a more open and inclusive economic order. Trumpian appeals to nationalism could unravel fragile new alliances. If that happens, China would be the big winner: it has always loathed the Asia rebalance and prefers to pick off countries one by one. Admirals, officials and lines of Japanese sailors heard Mr Carter’s farewell argument on the deck of the Izumo. He is set to repeat it in India, his next stop. But the audience that counts is one man, high in Trump Tower.